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Abstract 
The “problem of order” is resolved idyllically in Arrow-Debreu general-equilibrium models 
through the assumption of perfect information, where each actor is god-like, omniscient, and 
where this omniscience results in the veracity of the first theorem of welfare economics, 
where an equilibrium is Pareto efficient, where no actor, given her original endowments of 
alienable and inalienable capital, can improve her position. Analogously, in many religions, 
God is understood to be omniscient; order emerges through God’s ability to sanction 
malfeasance costlessly. Ideally, a comparable order would likewise be the consequence of the 
assumption in both economics and religion of an omnipotent principal. In both economics and 
religion, equilibria serve as idealized, transcendent, critical standards. In the real, immanent, 
world, where information is imperfect and no power is absolute, the institutionalization of law 
is necessary to maintain order. Religion has bequeathed to the legal order moral principles 
that may legitimate the law and make it binding, while economics, as a theory of incentives in 
the immanent world, models the imposition of legal sanctions, which penalize actors who 
approach and violate the law strategically. The law is an institutional order, where both 
constitutive norms and legal rules are legitimated through “religious” values and supported by 
“economic,” situational sanctions. 
Keywords: mixed methods, qualitative method, quantitative method, 
epistemology, reflexivity 
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Resumen 
El "problema del orden" se resuelve idílicamente en un modelo general de equilibrio Arrow-
Debreu partiendo de la asunción de información perfecta, donde cada actor es igual que Dios, 
omnisciente, y donde esta omnimiscencia es resultado de la veracidad del primer teorema de 
la economía del bienestar, donde tiene lugar un equilibrio de eficiencia de Pareto, donde 
ningún actor, partiendo de una determinada dotación de capital alienable e inalienable, puede 
mejorar su posición. Análogamente, en muchas religiones, Dios se concibe como 
omnisciente; el orden emerge a través de la habilidad de Dios de sancionar las infracciones a 
ningún coste. Idealmente, un orden comparable sería así mismo consecuencia de asumir un 
actor principal omnipotente, tanto en religión como en economía. Tanto en religión como en 
economía, el equilibrio funciona como un estándar idealizado, transcendente y crítico. En el 
inmanente mundo real, donde la información es imperfecta y ningún poder es absoluto, la 
institucionalización de la Ley es necesaria para mantener el orden. La religión ha transferido 
al orden legal moral principios que pueden legitimar la ley y hacerla vinculante, mientras que 
la economía, en tanto que teoría de incentivos en el mundo inmanente, modela la imposición 
de sanciones legales, lo que penaliza actores que se relacionan con la ley y la violan 
estratégicamente. La ley es un orden institucional, donde tanto las normas constitutivas como 
las normas legales se legitiman a través de valores "religiosos" y se apoyan en sanciones 
"económicas" situacionales.   
Palabras clave: métodos mixtos, método cualitativo, método cuantitativo, 
epistemología, reflexividad 
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his paper is an exploration of the “Problem of Order” and its 
resolution in three separate domains, economics, religion and the 
law1. I argue that, contrary to Talcott Parsons, the “Problem of 
Order” has been resolved successfully within neoclassical economic theory. 
This resolution is manifest in Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium models, 
where it is effected through the assumption of perfect information. Here each 
actor is god-like, omniscient, and this omniscience results in the veracity of 
the first theorem of welfare economics, that in equilibrium the characterized 
economy is a Pareto optimum, where each actor is as well off as possible 
(given the acceptance of her original alienable and inalienable capital) and 
no actor has a rational motivation to alter her position2. This result is no 
more than the mathematical consequence of a set of assumptions and has 
little relationship to the social world in which we live.  
 Analogously, in many religions, God is understood to be omniscient, all 
knowing. Order emerges through God’s ability to punish any and all 
malfeasance costlessly; of course, neither the punishment nor the order may 
be manifest in this world.  
 In addition, I will make a related, isomorphic argument drawn from 
economics; if in a society (or a firm) there is a principal with absolute 
power, social order is maintained, as economic activity is optimized and no 
one has any motivation to alter her position. This is analogous to the 
religious characterization of God as omnipotent, which has consequences 
matching those derivative from the assumption of God’s omniscience. In 
religion, the two arguments, about the omniscience and omnipotence of God, 
often run in tandem3; in economics, they are often stated as stark 
alternatives, a free market versus (an incomplete) economic absolutism in a 
command economy. However, both contentions have the same 
argumentative status: both solve the problem of order; both result in 
equilibria that serve as critical standards, defining “ideal normative orders”, 
and both are myths enabling believers to function, if not always effectively, 
in the world in which they actually live.  
 I conclude by showing that, in the real, immanent world, the 
institutionalization of law is necessary to maintain order. Here4, where 
information is imperfect and no power is absolute, legitimate procedures 
(secondary rules) generate justified and legitimate legal norms (primary 
rules) that are supported by situational sanctions5. Such a system is uncertain 
T 
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in its consequences, but like the theory able to depict it successfully, realistic 
in its characterization of the world in which we live. It derives in equal parts 
from religion and economics, when each moves from the realm of the 
transcendent to the realm of the immanent (Luhmann, 2000/2013). In our 
real world, religion has bequeathed us the moral principles in terms of which 
our law is binding, while economics enables the law to handle those actors 
who act strategically in response to a binding order; it does this through the 
imposition of sanctions6. Thus, the law is an institutional order, where both 
constitutive norms (secondary rules, procedures) and legal rules (primary 
rules constituted through secondary rules) are legitimated through (moral) 
values and supported by situational sanctions. 
 
 
Neoclassical Economics: Perfect and Imperfect Information 
 
In neoclassical theory, actors are understood to maximize (arguments in their 
utility functions) against constraints. The norm of instrumental rationality, 
maximization, is constant across all actors, across all times and spaces; 
preferences are exogenous. Thus there are three mechanisms in the theory: 
the single, positively-stated normative orientation, usually instrumental 
rationality, the exogenous ends, and the constraints, the situation(al 
sanctions). When economics is viewed as a theory of incentives, it is only 
the constraints, situational sanctions, that can be manipulated. I discuss two 
types of models within this theory, perfect and imperfect-information 
models. The former, in the form of Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium 
models, specify a transcendent ideal with little applicability to our immanent 
world. In the latter, in situations of uncertainty (asymmetrical information, 
bounded rationality) typical of our immanent world, actors may act in error 
or ignorance, trying to act instrumentally-rationally and failing, or thinking 
that they are acting instrumentally-rationally when they are not doing so. 
 The first equilibrium condition in Arrow-Debreu general-equilibrium 
models is that all factors of production receive the value of their marginal 
product as a price. (Equilibrium in economics means that no actor has any 
incentive to alter her position). This means that factors of production, e.g., 
laborers, that have equal productivity, receive an equal price in equilibrium7. 
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 If maximizing employers are not using the cheapest methods of 
production, they have an incentive to change to increase profits or to 
mitigate losses. The condition of minimum cost of production per unit 
output leads to the law of marginal productivity. The least cost combination 
of factors of production occurs when the marginal products of the factors are 
proportional to their prices. This condition is another way of suggesting that, 
in a competitive market, all producers are constrained to produce efficiently, 
to select that process of production that is most efficient, that generates the 
lowest per unit costs. 
 It is easy to show that these equilibrium conditions presume perfect 
information (Arrow, 1963; Stiglitz, 1991). Here, I will illustrate that this is 
so in a very simple characterization of an employment relationship. In the 
situation of perfect-information, both the principal and the agent know the 
value of the worker’s marginal product. The principal cannot pay the worker 
less (if she tries to do so, the worker will move to an employer who will pay 
a wage closer to the value of her marginal product and will stop moving only 
when she receives this value as a wage) and will not pay the worker more 
(which would result in a loss). Workers will move to the position where the 
value of their marginal product is maximized (and workers will stop moving 
only when the intrinsic values of their marginal products are equalized). 
There is no problem in motivating employees as the nature and the amount 
of their work is transparently/costlessly manifest to the employer; in 
consequence, in equilibrium, workers are always paid the value of their 
intrinsic marginal product. The movement between the capacity to labor and 
actual toil involves a “simple translation of one metric (hours) into another 
(work)” (Bowles & Gintis, 1985, p. 36). 
 In contrast, in an imperfect information model, where it is costly to 
determine the value of a worker’s marginal product, workers may shirk. 
Here every actor is acting in an instrumentally-rational way, which means 
that, in a situation of imperfect information, she may act opportunistically, 
strategically, or, as Williamson puts it, with self-seeking guile (adverse 
selection and moral hazard) (Williamson, 1985). Such an imperfect-
information model, in equilibrium, will not generally be at an optimum (This 
is a theme throughout Stiglitz’s work; for some easily intelligible 
discussions, see (Stiglitz, 1987; Stiglitz, 1985; Stiglitz, 1991); worse, in such 
a model, it may be shown that firms are constrained to maximize profits, and 
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that, unlike in perfect-information models (Koopmans, 1957), doing so is not 
equivalent to maximizing efficiency (Bowles, 1985; Bowles & Gintis, 1985; 
Gould, 1994). Thus, while, in equilibrium, perfect-information models meet 
the first theorem of welfare economics, constitute social order, and delimit a 
critical standard, none of this is the case for imperfect-information models. 
The immanent, where information is imperfect, is not congruent with the 
transcendent, where information is perfect. In our immanent world, 
malfeasance is possible and incentives matter. 
 
 
Monotheism: God as Omniscient 
 
The point, in a discussion of God as omniscient, is simply, as Atran has 
commented, “To keep the morally corrosive temptations to deceive or defect 
under control, all concerned—whether beggar or king—must truly believe 
that the gods are always watching” (Scott Atran, as quoted in (Herrnstein 
Smith, 2010, p. 83). While an omniscient God may not regulate action to 
maximize benefits in this (immanent) life, in the next, transcendent, life such 
a God is understood to judge humans justly, using as a standard whatever 
criteria God has enunciated for us. 
 Thus, in monotheistic religions, order is constituted through adherence to 
God’s expectations, which define for us, in our current realities, a critical 
standard, which will be realized, out of time, for all of us. The moral values 
that constitute this standard may regulate our immanent lives, but they are 
realized fully only in a world set apart from the world in which we live. In 
our immanent world, incentives matter for most of us much of the time and 
for all of us some of the time8. 
 
 
Neoclassical Economics: Absolute Power 
 
In perfect-information neoclassical models, the principal knows costlessly 
the actions and their consequences for every agent for all time. In 
neoclassical models that assume absolute power, the agent must fulfill the 
principal’s orders transparently (or the loss due to a negative sanction will 
out-weigh any possible gain from attempting to buck absolute power).   
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 We may show that in a Marxian model, where surplus value is generated, 
the extraction of labor (work) from labor-power (the capacity to work) 
requires an asymmetry of power between principals (employers) and agents 
(employees), but, paradoxically, this asymmetry cannot be absolute9. 
Absolute power is analytically equivalent to the situation where the 
extraction of the maximum work from the worker would be costless for the 
employer. In consequence, there would be an invariant relationship between 
the number of workers and the work they performed; labor would be 
transformed into a commodity like all other commodities and competition 
would eliminate any and all profits/surplus value (apart from those 
dependent on variations in inter-firm efficiency). This is, once again, a 
situation where all firms are constrained to produce efficiently, selecting 
from available production processes those that result in the least cost 
combination of factors of production and where the marginal products of the 
factors are proportional to their prices10. We may generalize this point to 
suggest that, if a political ruler had absolute power, a command economy 
would produce efficiently. The outcome would be isomorphic to the one 
generated with the same production technologies within a perfect-
information model, and like that model, would resolve the problem of order 
and might serve as a critical standard11. Thus, even though, ideologically, the 
notions of perfect-information markets and absolute-power command 
economies are incompatible, as critical standards they generate equivalent 
outcomes, and they both, if only theoretically, resolve the problem of order 
(one in the manner of Locke and the other in the manner of Hobbes). 
 
 
Monotheism: God as Omnipotent 
 
Conceptualizations of the nature of God’s omnipotence in monotheistic 
religions vary considerably, but all presume that God is capable of 
intervening in the world to make it as he wishes, that he chooses not to do 
so, and that this raises the problem of theodicy, of evil in the world. Evil, 
usually understood to be motivated by unregulated desire or some form of 
temptation (for example, by Satan), is a deviation from God’s standard. 
Unlike treason, evil sometimes, at least in this world, prospers (even though 
God has the power to eliminate it)12.  
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 While the problem of theodicy is resolved differently in different creeds, 
its resolution in monotheism results through God’s power to impose his 
judgment on humans, if not in this life, in an afterlife. Humans are judged in 
terms of whether they have met God’s expectations of them, and these 
expectations are instituted as an ethical standard integral in constituting a 
normative order, a critical standard that delimits an ideal. The problem of 
evil manifests that this standard is not realized in our immanent world. 
 
 
The Institutionalization of the Law 
 
Luhmann characterizes religion as an articulation of relationships between 
the transcendent and the immanent (Luhmann, 2000/2013). In our immanent 
world, while both religion and economics set critical standards (Axial Age 
religions were the first critical theory (Eisenstadt, 1986) and welfare 
economics was the first critical theory in the social sciences), these standards 
are not self-implementable. We do not live a world where all actors have 
perfect information, nor where one actor has absolute power; such a world is 
analogous to the transcendent world postulated in religions. We do not live 
in a world where God controls directly how we act, and if God knows 
everything about our actions, it is in a transcendent world seemingly loosely 
coupled, even for believers, with the immanent world in which we live. Thus 
we are confronted with the necessity of controlling economic opportunism, 
of regulating moral-religious malfeasance, in the world in which we live. We 
do so, at least in part, through the law. 
 Contrary to legal positivists (including Luhmann (1972/1985)), the 
institutionalization of the law requires its legitimation in terms of moral 
standards, and while these moral standards are not necessarily “religious”, 
they derive from religion, where they were first articulated. While the legal 
positivists claim that law derives its validity procedurally, that primary rules 
are valid when the due process outcome of secondary rules, constitutive 
rules, procedures13, they are unable to explain why one set of procedures has 
this power of justification, when others do not. In fact, primary rules are 
valid only when they are the due process outcome of legitimate procedures, 
procedures that are consistent with the moral values that are partially 
constitutive of the law, and when they themselves, the primary rules, are also 
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legitimate, consistent with those same moral values. When this is the case, 
actors view the primary rules as binding (Gould, 1992; Gould, 1993; Gould, 
1996). This is the articulation between religion, which sets a moral standard, 
and the law. 
 However, not all actors will view these valid laws as binding. Some will 
approach them opportunistically. They will calculate the cost and benefit of 
violating them. To control such actors, to motivate them to conform, 
situational sanctions must be used as incentives. Known violations of the 
primary rules must be negatively sanctioned. This is the articulation of a 
theory of incentives, economics, which clarifies the application of these 
sanctions, and the law. 
 In our immanent world, legal norms are inextricably linked to the 
sanctions that support them, but an adequate understanding of this 
relationship requires the recognition that sanctions are more than incentives 
that must be aligned with the normative expectations; they are also crucial in 
the constitution and reinforcement of the principles themselves.  
 For Durkheim14, the primary function of punishment is to characterize the 
boundaries of acceptable activity, to aid in constituting the normative. If an 
actor violates a legitimate norm, he must be punished to reinforce the 
binding nature of the norm among those already committed to it (Durkheim, 
1893/1984, p. 63). If known violations of social norms are allowed to pass 
unpunished, the sense of normative obligation will be undermined 
(Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 240). When the punishment is vested in an 
organized body representative of the social group, the institutionalized status 
of the norm for members of that group is manifest (Durkheim, 1893/1984, p. 
52). The consequence of this punishment is the maintenance of social 
cohesion, by way of a reinforcement of the vitality of normative 
expectations. 
 Further, the application of negative sanctions in the face of deviance 
protects the righteous from being treated as suckers. If conformity to a social 
norm puts one at a disadvantage in comparison to opportunistic violators of 
that norm, knowing that deviance is likely to be punished enables those 
committed to the norm to conform to it without feeling like chumps, without 
feeling that they function at a comparative disadvantage to their more 
opportunistic compatriots. Normative obligations may mandate conformity 
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to certain expectations, but actual conformity is more likely when interest 
and obligation are well aligned, when desire and desirable are congruent. 
 In our immanent world, the law is an institutional order, where legal 
norms are legitimated by values and supported by situational sanctions. This 
order is uncertain in its consequences, but like the theory able to characterize 
it effectively, one that conceptualizes both normative orders and situational 
constraints and opportunities15, it is realistic in its characterization of the 
world in which we live.  
 
 
Postscript: Theory 
 
To analyze adequately the nature of the law, we need a theory capable of 
depicting it comprehensively; only then will we be able to explain its nature 
and variations. Economic theory is inadequate to the task (Gould, 1981; 
Gould, 1989; Gould, 1991; Parsons, 1937/1949). It is positivistic, 
conceptualizing a single, positively-stated normative orientation. The only 
subjective dimension in the theory is the end actors maximize, their 
preferences/desires/goals. It is thus incapable of conceptualizing 
meaningfully legal norms, and a fortiori, religious values. They must be 
reduced either to preferences, arguments in a utility function, or the 
situational sanctions that support them. Thus, while economists have 
theorized the nature and effects of incentives, positive and negative 
situational sanctions, with great sophistication, neoclassical economics is 
incapable of characterizing and explaining normative orientations16. 
 Most discussions of religion are hermeneutic; they take seriously human 
subjectivity, and attempt to understand how religion constitutes a 
meaningful world as, in its post-Axial Age form, it constitutes religious 
commitments. These characterizations are idealistic, reducing human action 
to the normative orientations (or more generally to forms of subjectivity) 
that regulate it. Thus, they are able to characterize the moral values that 
legitimate the law, but not the situational sanctions that are brought to bear 
on those who approach the law strategically (Gould, 2013a). 
 As idealist and positivist characterizations of transcendent structures of 
religion and models of efficient economic relationships, these reductionist 
theories are adequate. As characterizations of binding law they fail 
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miserably17. The law is a nexus of procedures (secondary rules) that justify 
primary rules. To be binding, both the procedures and the primary rules must 
be legitimate in terms of shared moral values. Only legitimate procedures 
have the capacity to justify. Primary rules that are illegitimate will be 
approached calculatingly, and conformity, when and if it occurs, will be 
motivated by sanctions. In addition, because there will always be people 
who approach valid laws strategically (and because all actors will act 
strategically sometimes), primary rules must be supported, more generally, 
by situational sanctions to motivate compliance. Known violations of legal 
rules must be punished. To scrutinize such legal institutions effectively 
requires a non-reductionist theory capable of conceptualizing both normative 
orientations (of various sorts), and the social situations within in which 
women and men act. Parsons has labeled such theories voluntarist (Parsons, 
1937/1949). 
 Voluntarist theories conceptualize social action in a way that maintains 
the integrity of its subjective/normative orientations, but also recognize that 
all action takes place within social situations. Thus, in Durkheim’s sense, 
they enable us to create a science of morality. In our terms, they enable the 
analysis of how law (and religion and the economy) function(s) in our 
immanent world. 
 The law is an institutional structure, a set of legal rules, justified 
procedurally and legitimated through a set of social values, and, at the same 
time, reinforced through the application of situational sanctions. It is 
unintelligible apart from a characterization of religion and economics as 
transcendent, but its successful analysis requires a theory capable of 
integrating effectively the two types of critical standards drawn from the 
articulation of religion and economics as critical “theories.” At least since 
the axial age, our immanent world has been the articulation of critical 
standards with situational constraints, imperfect in its construction, yet 
aspiring to something better.  
 
 
Notes  
 
1 This paper was inspired by the comment of a former student, Dary Patten, who, in an 
“Economic Sociology” seminar, suggested that actors in perfect-information neoclassical 
models were assumed to be god-like, omniscient and omnipotent 
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2 In this paper, I explore neither the differences in the conceptualization of this original 
position, nor their consequences. In religion, such a discussion would take us into an 
examination of whether actors are conceptualized as fallible, perhaps due to “original sin,” or 
fundamentally “good”; in economics, where actors, in equilibrium in perfect-information 
models, receive as a wage the value of their marginal product, we would examine why some 
workers would chose to work hard, for more, or less hard, for less. 
3
Luhmann, 2000/2013, p. 113
 “We do not need to argue…that omniscience prevails over omnipotence of the will (or vice-
versa). They are identical” ( ). 
4 “Here,” implicitly, refers to parliamentary democracies. 
5 Primary rules that are both legitimate in terms of shared social values and justified in terms 
of legitimate procedures may be said to be valid. 
6 
Knight, 1933/1965
In neoclassical theory, actors are understood to maximize (arguments in their utility 
functions) against constraints. When viewed, as it is often these days, as a theory of 
incentives, it is only the constraints, situational sanctions, that can be manipulated. In 
neoclassical models of the economy these are usually prices ( ); in 
neoclassical models of other social activities, including crime, they may be forms of 
punishment (Becker, 1976). 
7 In equilibrium, the productivity of each factor of production is intrinsic. 
8
Gould, 2005
 For attempts to characterize the logic of religious commitment in various religions, see 
( ; Gould, 2013b; Schluchter, 1979/1981; Schluchter, 1989; Weber, 1917-
1919/1952; Weber, 1958; Weber, 1904-1905/1958; Weber, 1964). 
9 
Bowles, 1985
 The same argument might be made in the context of imperfect-information, efficiency-wage 
models ( ; Bulow & Summers, 1986; Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984/1986). 
10
Roemer, 1982
 This argument is paradoxical. In Arrow-Debreu models there is no power; capitalists have 
no power over workers, who are protected by other capitalists; workers would make the same 
economic decisions as capitalists, e.g., organize production in the same way as capitalists 
( ; Roemer, 1982/1986). The paradox is that the same is true in models that 
assume absolute power. Implicitly we have presumed that capitalists have such power, but we 
might as well postulate that such power is vested in workers. 
11
Trotsky, 1932
 This conclusion may be derived from mid-twentieth century discussions of socialism, 
which showed that the source of inefficiency in a command economy is imperfect 
information/imperfect control. See, for example, Trotsky’s remarks: “If a universal mind 
existed, of the kind that projected itself into the scientific fancy of Laplace – a mind that 
could register simultaneously all the processes of nature and society, that could measure the 
dynamics of their motion, that could forecast the results of their inter-reactions – such a mind, 
of course, could a priori draw up a faultless and exhaustive economic plan, beginning with the 
number of acres of wheat down to the last button for a vest” ( ). The same 
conclusion may be derived from transaction-cost economics; see, for the first statement, 
(Coase, 1937/1952). 
12 “Treason doth never prosper: what’s the reason? Why, if it prosper, none dare call it 
treason” (John Harrington). The presumption is that God’s standard is not effaced when evil 
prospers. 
13
Habermas, 1992/1996
 This procedural position, which, in one way or another, sees moral values as irrelevant to 
positive law, is widespread; see ( ; Hart, 1961/1997; Luhmann, 
1972/1985). 
14
Gould, 2001b
 This paragraph and the next draw on my “Social Norms: A Critique of Law and Economics 
Formulations and a Guide to their Correct Conceptualization” ( ). 
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15
Parsons, 1937/1949
 This is the “voluntaristic theory of action” that Parsons posited in The Structure of Social 
Action ( ). 
16 Gould, 2001b I make this argument comprehensively in ( ). See also (Gould, 2001a). 
17
 
 Of course, they also fail as characterizations of actual economies and religious institutions 
in the immanent world. 
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